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Complementary or Competing Freedoms:
Government Officials, Religious Freedom,
and LGBTQ Rights*
Frank S. Ravitch**
I. INTRODUCTION
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This essay is adapted from a Chapter in FRANK S. RAVITCH, FREEDOM’S EDGE: RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, SEXUAL FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (forthcoming 2016).
**
Professor of Law and Walter H. Stowers Chair in Law & Religion, Director, Kyoto Japan
Program, Michigan State University College of Law. The author would like to thank the participants in
the FIU Law Review’s Religion and the Law Symposium for helpful comments and questions and the
excellent staff of the FIU Law Review for the amazing organization and quality of the symposium.
1
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2
Dominic Holden, Kim Davis’s Lawyers Have Said Things that Are Literally Unbelievable,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 14, 2015, 3:57 PM), www.buzzfeed.com/dominicholden/kim-daviss-lawyershave-said-things-that-are-literally-unbel#.vcmdAkxE4.
3
Id.
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The story of Clerk Kim Davis from Rowan County, Kentucky, made
headlines across the country. Almost everyone is familiar with her refusal
to provide marriage licenses after the United States Supreme Court held that
same-sex marriage is a fundamental right that cannot be denied to same-sex
couples.1 Ironically, however, her case may have done more to obfuscate
the issue of religious accommodations for government officials than to
enlighten people about the issue.
This is in part because of the grandstanding that occurred in her case.
Davis and her attorneys turned her into a cause célèbre, and in the process
made claims that turned out to be false;2 some of which did not relate
directly to her legal arguments.3 Meanwhile, around the country, other
government employees have sought accommodation without becoming
cause célèbres. These cases raise many questions that will be addressed in
this Essay.
Must religious freedom claims by government officials be
accommodated when the requested accommodation is to not perform duties
for which the official was elected or hired? If such accommodations are not
mandatory, should they be given? And if so, under what circumstances?
Does the availability of other officials who can perform the duties make a
difference? What about the argument that dignitary harm results when a
government official requests that someone else perform her duties? Does
media attention figure into the question of dignitary harm?
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II. ISSUES WITH ACCOMMODATING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Should we accommodate government officials and employees who
seek religious exemptions in cases involving sexual freedom? The answer is
a qualified “yes.” Of course, the details matter. In some situations, a balance
can be reached that will maximize protection for sexual freedom while
allowing religious accommodation of government employees. In states that
have Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRA), or other laws that
protect the religious freedom of government officials, the boundaries drawn
would determine when accommodation is mandatory. In all other states, the
boundaries drawn would determine when permissive accommodations are

C M
Y K

04/28/2016 10:11:02

4
FRANK S. RAVITCH, FREEDOM’S EDGE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, SEXUAL FREEDOM, AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICA (forthcoming 2016).
5
Id.
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As will be seen, the biggest problem with Kim Davis’ claim was not
her personal refusal to issue marriage licenses, but rather her refusal
initially to allow anyone in her office to do so. There is a fundamental
difference between a government official seeking accommodation and an
official seeking to keep others, even those whom she supervises, from
following the law. Additionally, the media firestorm her situation
generated––and which she helped to foster––raises additional questions that
may not be present when a county clerk simply asks that others in her office
issue same-sex marriage licenses.
This Essay is adapted from a key chapter in a forthcoming book,
Freedom’s Edge: Religious Freedom, Sexual Freedom, and the Future of
America.4 In the book, I argue that Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender
and Queer (LGBTQ) rights, reproductive rights, and religious freedom
share common themes and common ground. Moreover, I argue that the
supposed tension between these freedoms does not exist in most religious
freedom claims, such as situations where Native Americans seek to
maintain rituals and practices that conflict with federal or state law, but
have no direct impact on anyone other than the persons or tribes seeking
accommodation. Significantly, the book focuses heavily on those situations
where conflict or tension does exist, suggesting that these situations should
be resolved in a manner that minimizes harms and burdens on all sides.5
The county clerk/government official context provides an excellent example
of how these harms and burdens can be minimized. This Essay does not
address the broader issue of why we should maximize freedom and
minimize burdens on all sides, but it does provide proof that maximizing
freedom and minimizing burdens can be achieved even in a highly
contested context.
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6
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (exemptions to
generally applicable laws are not required by the Free Exercise Clause, but government entities are free
to give accommodations to generally applicable laws if they choose to do so).
7
See RAVITCH, supra note 4, at chs. 1–3.
8
Smith, 494 U.S. at 872 (no duty to provide exemptions to generally applicable laws under the
Free Exercise Clause).
9
See RAVITCH, supra note 4, at chs. 1–2.
10
See infra Part III.
11
In fact, in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the state of Virginia relied in part on religious
arguments and the Court resoundingly rejected those arguments as being based on a more general theme
of racial inferiority (along with the state’s other arguments). As will be discussed below, Loving and the
unconstitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws generally, while helpful in demonstrating the
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, are not as helpful in addressing claims for religious
exemptions from supporting same-sex marriage because of significant historical and theological
differences.
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allowed if the relevant government entity seeks to accommodate.6
For the reasons explained in Freedom’s Edge,7 I think
accommodations should be given except when doing so will impose a direct
and meaningful harm on others. Of course, the question of what
accommodations will result in direct and meaningful harm raises a number
of unique problems when those seeking accommodation are government
officials. As a matter of law there is no duty to accommodate unless a
RFRA or other law requires doing so.8 Thus, my argument is not that
government entities must accommodate in the absence of a legal
requirement to do so, but rather that they should accommodate regardless of
whether there is a legal mandate to do so when doing so will not result in
direct and meaningful harm to others.9 On the flip side, even in states with
RFRAs, or other relevant laws that apply to government officials or
employees, accommodation may not be required unless certain parameters
are met.10 These parameters are discussed in detail in the next section. First,
some of the specific issues raised in the context of accommodating
government officials and employees must be addressed.
A number of factors make situations involving government officials
especially complex. Government officials are elected or hired to serve the
public generally, so when they seek an exemption to refuse service to a
specific group within the public––especially in relation to a right
recognized by the United States Supreme Court––alarm bells should sound.
For example, if a government official refused to grant marriage licenses to
interracial couples based on a religious argument, no court would allow
such an injustice to stand.11 Why should the situation be any different when
a government official asserts a religious objection to issuing same-sex
marriage licenses?
First, there is an analogy to be made on the basic rights. The
Obergefell Court did rely—and I would assert correctly so—in part on
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Loving v. Virginia to support its holding that denying the right to same-sex
marriage violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.12 Yet, this analogy does not address the question of
religious accommodations. The nature and history of religious objections to
interracial marriages and the nature and history of religious objection to
same-sex marriage are quite different.13 Second, religious objections to
interracial marriage were directly connected to a broader system of
racism,14 while religious objections to same-sex marriage are often limited
to the issue of marriage itself.15 In fact, this is reflected directly in the
opinions finding a constitutional right to interracial marriage and to samesex marriage. In Loving v. Virginia,16 the case in which the United States
Supreme Court held that anti-miscegenation laws (laws that prohibited
interracial marriage) are unconstitutional, the Court wrote: “The fact that
Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own
justification, as measures designed to maintain white supremacy.”17 Yet, in
Obergefell v. Hodges,18 the case in which the Court held there is a
constitutional right to same-sex marriage, the Court specifically noted:

There are certainly people who object to same-sex marriage based on
bigotry and not religious principal. If any of these people were government

12

C M
Y K

04/28/2016 10:11:02

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99, 2602–04 (2015).
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock et
al. eds., 2008); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 28 J.L. & POL. 91,
114 (2013); Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 407 (2011). But see James M. Oleske, Jr., The Evolution of Accommodation: Comparing the
Unequal Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. CIV.
RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 99 (2015) (arguing that the differences between religious objections to same-sex
marriage and interracial marriage have been overblown).
14
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
15
Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 28 J.L. & POL. 91, 111–14
(2013).
16
388 U.S. at 1.
17
Id. at 11.
18
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
19
Id. at 2607.
13
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Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to
religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere
conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be
condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations
and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the
principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths,
and to their deep aspirations to continue the family structure they have
long revered.19
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20
See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (holding DOMA
unconstitutional in part because it disparaged same-sex couples who could legally marry in one state
from affirming “their commitment to one another before their . . . community”); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado constitutional amendment that prevented any government entity
within the state from protecting people from discrimination based on sexual orientation because the
basis for the proposed amendment was discriminatory).
21
Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015).
While Mary Ann Case and I disagree on the possibility of finding workable accommodations that
adequately protect rights on both sides of the debate, she pointed out this concern in her talk at the
symposium and in her earlier article. See Mary Ann Case, Why “Live-And-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable
Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodations in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S.
CAL. L. REV. 463 (2015) (concerned about the slippery slope accommodation claims will take in
derogation of the rights of others). In the context of accommodating government employees, I agree
with her concern and that of Judge Bunning in the Davis case, about setting a dangerous precedent, but
as explained infra at Part III, with proper parameters these claims can be workable. The parameters are
based, in part, on Judge Bunnings careful analysis in Miller v. Davis.
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officials and asserted a religious objection to issuing same-sex marriage
licenses based on the argument that members of the LGBTQ community are
inferior or should not interact with the heterosexual community on an equal
basis, the exemption should be denied.20 This is because the level of harm
caused by granting an exemption in these circumstances would far
outweigh the government official’s religious freedom interest. It is not
because the request for an exemption is religiously based.
The above are not the only concern with granting exemptions to
government officials and employees. Two other factors are highly
relevant—the proper role of government officials and the Establishment
Clause. First, the person seeking the exemption is a government official.
Government officials are elected or hired to serve the public generally.
Allowing them to pick and choose who they will serve could set a
dangerous precedent.21 Should a devout Christian government official who
believes that she can only interact with Christians and that refuses to serve
Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, and Atheist citizens be accommodated? What
about an extremely devout Wahhabi Muslim man who objects to interacting
with female citizens?
The answer is “no,” because the accommodations would prevent the
official from doing his job for a large percentage of the public; so while the
government could give a permissive accommodation, there are good
reasons why it shouldn’t. How can we determine the line of demarcation
between these situations and a clerk who seeks an accommodation to not
issue same-sex marriage licenses? The key is in the parameters discussed in
the next section. Unless the person’s main duty is issuing marriage licenses,
they can fulfill their other duties. And so long as someone else can issue the
licenses without any inconvenience to any citizens, the situation is quite
different. The former situations are more akin to someone who refuses to
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See supra notes 12–20, and accompanying text.
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 343
(2014).
24
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
25
Id. at 890.
26
544 U.S. 709 (2005).
27
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761–62 (2014) (RLUIPA altered RFRA to expand
its focus beyond pre-Smith law). But see Frank S. Ravitch, Be Careful What You Wish for: Why Hobby
Lobby Weakens Religious Freedom, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that the Hobby
Lobby Court was wrong about the impact of RLUIPA on RFRA).
28
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719–26.
29
Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
30
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
31
Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015).
32
This has not happened in any state, but legislation has been proposed in Alabama that would
eliminate the requirement for marriage licenses, but this bill would change the process so that couples
23
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serve any LGBTQ citizens. The government has the strongest interest in not
accommodating such a person.22
Next, accommodating government officials might raise Establishment
Clause concerns that are not raised in other accommodation contexts.23 For
example, wouldn’t accommodating a government official who refuses to
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples or who refuses to perform a
same-sex civil ceremony be a violation of the Establishment Clause? The
short answer is “no,” but with one major exception discussed below. In
Employment Division v. Smith,24 the Supreme Court specifically held that
permissive accommodations are allowed.25 In Cutter v. Wilkinson,26 the
Supreme Court specifically addressed this issue and held that application of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), a
statute that applies the same—or perhaps an even more stringent level of
protection—than RFRA,27 does not violate the Establishment Clause.28
The major exception occurs when a government endorses or advances
religion through the accommodation. This can happen when states pass
laws that are designed to promote religion rather than simply accommodate
it.29 For example, if a state designs a law to favor specific religious values
or passes a law that favors those values in a manner that could harm the
rights of others, there is a significant likelihood of an Establishment Clause
violation.30 This could happen if a law was passed that mandated
accommodation for government employees, but did nothing to protect the
rights of same-sex couples in areas where no government employee is
available to give a marriage license or perform a civil ceremony.31 This
could also happen if a state ended all civil ceremonies and made no
allowance for other non-religious means of a marriage, therefore only
allowing marriages to be validated through a religious entity.32
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Two states have already provided legal models for accommodating
religious government employees without harming the rights of same-sex
couples. Both North Carolina and Utah have passed laws that require
someone be available to grant marriage licenses and perform same-sex civil
ceremonies at the same times they are available to opposite-sex couples,
while also allowing for religious accommodations for government
employees.33 These laws are not perfect, and some of the advocates of these
bills seemed more concerned with protecting religious claims than with
compromise, but the resulting laws protect the right of same-sex couples to
get marriage licenses without delay or a lowering of available services.
Neither law addresses parameter five below, but both do engage in
balancing rights in a manner that should not violate the Establishment
Clause.
III. THE PARAMETERS NECESSARY FOR ACCOMMODATING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS WITHOUT MATERIALLY HARMING THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
In this section I will set forth, and then explain, the basic parameters
necessary to accommodate government officials and employees without
imposing direct and meaningful harm on others. After that, I will look at
two state laws, one in North Carolina and one in Utah that address these
questions. Both of these laws address in a careful and balanced manner four
of the five parameters I discuss. Neither law, however, addresses the fifth
parameter. The parameters are designed to minimize harm to same-sex
couples while protecting religious freedom. They are designed to work both
in the RFRA and permissive accommodation contexts.
First, government officials and employees should be accommodated in
cases where a government official seeks a religious accommodation
and there are others who are able to fulfill the duties of that official
without causing any delay or reduction in service to citizens, unless the
fifth parameter below is violated.
Second, there should be no accommodation where the only
government official able to carry out a function, or all officials able to

C M
Y K

04/28/2016 10:11:02

would submit a marriage contract which would then be recorded rather than the probate judge issuing a
marriage license. Mike Cason, Bill to Eliminate Marriage Licenses Moves Closer to Passing,
ALABAMA.COM (Sept. 14, 2015), www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/09/bill_to_eliminate_marriage_
lic.html. While the law raises numerous practical and legal problems there is no reason to believe that
this would lead to a requirement of a marriage ceremony that could only be performed by a religious
entity.
33
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-5.5, 7A-292(b) (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17-20-4, 30-1-6, 63G20-101, et seq. (West 2015).
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Here are the five parameters:
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carry out the function, seek accommodation to avoid doing so.
Moreover, under these circumstances there should be no
accommodation even under RFRA.
Third, accommodation should be given unless the fifth parameter is
violated, where a government official seeks an accommodation beyond
excusal from performing a specific duty, such as having his or her
name removed from marriage license forms, so long as the
accommodation would not invalidate or call into question the right or
benefit conferred on citizens.
Fourth, there should be no accommodation where the accommodation
sought is an exemption from performing on an equal basis the primary
duty the official was elected or hired to perform.
Fifth, accommodation should be denied or revoked when a
government official acting in his or her official capacity calls attention
to the refusal to perform a duty, either through contacting the media or
through direct confrontation with the citizens he or she refuses to
serve.
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34
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-5.5(a)–(c), 7A-292(b) (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-20-4(1)-(2)
(West 2015).
35
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-5.5(a)–(c), 7A-292(b) (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-20-4(1)-(2)
(West 2015).
36
This does seem implicit in Utah Code § 17-20-4(1)–(2), but it is not spelled out. Interestingly,
Utah Code § 63G-20-101, et seq., prohibits discrimination as a result of either religion or sexuality in a
variety of contexts.
37
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-5.5, 7A-292(b) (2015).
38
Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12,
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The first parameter makes sense as a balance between religious
freedom and same-sex marriage rights. So long as there is no denial, delay,
or reduction in service, the fact that a specific official or employee does not
issue a license or perform a civil marriage ceremony would not violate or
infringe on the rights of any citizen. The key is that there be someone else
who is ready, willing, and legally able to issue the license or solemnize the
marriage. This is precisely what the North Carolina and Utah laws require.34
These laws are reasonably clear that no denial or reduction in service is
allowed,35 but the Utah law could be improved by spelling out more clearly
that no delay in services should be allowed.36 The North Carolina law seems
clear on this.37
This factor is the one that most clearly works against Kim Davis.
Having others perform the duty in question is an obvious accommodation,
and yet one she did not seek. From the start she had at least one clerk
willing to issue licenses,38 and subsequently all but one clerk agreed to issue
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39
Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, at 1 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 2015), www.just security.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/bunning.lift_.pdf (“[F]ive of her six clerks stated under oath that they
would comply with the Court’s Order and issue marriage licenses to all legally eligible couples.”).
40
Davis, 2015 WL 4866729, at *3 (she was not willing to allow it after one clerk agreed to issue
licenses).
41
Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, at 1 n.1 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 8, 2015), www.
justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/bunning.lift_.pdf (“Plaintiffs marriage licenses have been
altered so that ‘Rowan County’ rather than ‘Kim Davis’ appears on the line reserved for the name of the
county clerk, [and] Plaintiffs have not argued that the alterations affect the validity of the licenses.”).
42
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17-20-4(2), 30-1-6 (West 2015) (requiring that a county clerk or
designee be available during business hours to solemnize a legal marriage and adding this to the list of
those who may solemnize marriages).
43
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-5.5(a)–(c), 7A-292(b) (West 2015).
44
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
45
See Davis, 2015 WL 4866729, at *7–8.
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licenses,39 yet she initially refused to allow them to do so.40 Interestingly,
her reason for refusing this obvious accommodation was concern about
facilitating sin by having her name on the licenses. Facilitating something
that violates one’s deepest religious convictions is serious, but parameter
three addresses this concern. As will be seen, she could have been
accommodated by having her name removed from the forms, but that too
was not adequate for her.41 If accommodation is available, but the person
seeking accommodation refuses to accept available accommodations and
insists on accommodations that would directly and materially have a
negative impact on third parties, that individual cannot be accommodated.
The second parameter is a natural corollary to the first parameter. If
there is no one else who can issue a marriage license or perform a civil
ceremony without delay there should be no accommodation. This could
occur because only one person is authorized to issue the license or perform
the ceremony, as in the case of a small county office, or it could occur
because everyone authorized to do so seeks an exemption. The North
Carolina and Utah laws require that someone be available to issue the
license or perform the ceremony so that this problem is avoided. The Utah
law expands the range of officials who can perform these duties to help
facilitate this,42 and the North Carolina law sets up a system that could
provide immediate backup in situations where exemptions are given.43
The one accommodation that is not available is to deny or limit access
to marriage licenses (and by analogy civil ceremonies). This is a logical
corollary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell,44 and a point
specifically spelled out in Judge Bunning’s opinion in the Kim Davis case.45
Allowing such an accommodation would violate the fundamental rights of
couples denied the licenses. The fact that the couples might go to other
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Id. at *6–7.
See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
48
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
49
Id.
50
RAVITCH, supra note 4, at ch. 3.
51
References to the Attorney General and Governor are to those from the Beshear
administration, which ended on December 8, 2015. The new administration has implemented some
changes, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Essay.
52
Eliana Dockterman, Kim Davis’ Lawyers Argue Altered Marriage Licenses Are Valid, TIME
(Oct. 13, 2015), http://time.com/4072544/kim-davis-marriage-licenses (noting State Attorney General
and Governor have approved the altered licenses as valid).
53
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.100(1)(c) (West 2006) requires the use of a form prescribed by
the state Department of Libraries and Archives, but only requires the signature of the “county clerk or
47
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counties does not solve this problem.46 Since there is a fundamental right to
marriage, and that right cannot be denied to same-sex couples, it follows
that limiting the times and places that right can be effectuated in order to
preclude same-sex couples from receiving marriage licenses in a given
location violates the fundamental right and denies the couple equal
protection of the law.
There is no constitutional basis for doing so under the Free Exercise
Clause in this context because marriage laws are generally applicable.47
Therefore, any countervailing free exercise right would arise under a statute
such as a RFRA, under a state constitution, or as a matter of permissible
accommodation. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
answers any doubts as to which law prevails when a federal constitutional
right is violated by federal statute, state constitution, or state law.48 The
right under the U.S. Constitution prevails.49 Even if this were not the case,
the government would have a compelling interest in upholding the U.S.
Constitution under a state RFRA, and allowing accommodation so long as
someone can perform the relevant duties. Moreover, denying
accommodation where someone else could not perform the relevant duties
under state law seems narrowly tailored to meet the interest in upholding
the U.S. Constitution.
The third parameter is quite interesting. It raises the question of
“facilitating evil,” which is a major focus of conscience claims generally,
and an issue addressed in great detail in Freedom’s Edge.50 What happens
when a county clerk or other government official does not want his or her
name on marriage licenses issued to same sex couples? The Kim Davis case
raised this issue. In that case, however, two things kept this issue from
being the primary focus.
First, the state Attorney General and the Governor51 have said that
licenses altered by Davis to remove her name are valid under state law.52
This seems consistent with the state law governing marriage licenses,53 but
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deputy county clerk issuing the license.” Therefore, if the state Department of Libraries and Archives
does not require the name of the clerk to be on the form, removal of the name should not be a problem.
54
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.080 (West 2006), requires that the license be issued by “the clerk
of the county.” § 402.100(1)(c) suggests that this might include deputy clerks, but one might argue that
it must be the County Clerk him or herself. Moreover, § 402.100(3)(a) requires that after the ceremony
is performed a certificate must be delivered by the person performing the ceremony and that the
certificate must include “the name of the county clerk under whose authority the license was issued.”
Again, this could be interpreted to include the deputy clerk’s when the county clerk refuses to issue
licenses or have her name on the licenses, a position with which the governor and state attorney general
seem to agree, see supra note 52, and accompanying text, but one could argue against this interpretation
under the statute.
55
See Dockterman, supra note 52, and accompanying text.
56
Id. (noting State Attorney General and Governor have approved the altered licenses as valid).
57
RAVITCH, supra note 4.
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one could read the state law to require licenses to have the clerk’s name on
them.54 The Kentucky Governor and Attorney General’s reading seems to
be both the better legal interpretation and the best practical approach.55
Second, Davis initially refused to allow other clerks in her office to
issue the licenses, which made whether her name appeared on the licensees
secondary to the question of issuing the licenses. The questions were
certainly intertwined. The fact that Davis’ name would be on the licenses
was one of the reasons she refused to allow others in her office to issue the
licenses. She also initially believed that if her name were removed from the
licenses they would be invalid, although she later changed this position.56
Davis was initially wrong on the latter point, but the reason for parameter
number three is to assure that where a clerk is willing to allow others in her
office to follow the law, concerns about having her name on a document
that violates her fundamental religious tenets can be accommodated.
The best way to approach this would be to allow just the name of the
county, or a state office, to be on marriage licenses. This is, of course, a
question of state law. It may be impossible to accommodate a clerk who
wants her name removed if the state requires the name of the clerk to be on
the license for it to be valid. If the state does not require the clerk’s name to
be on marriage licenses, even where the practice is to include the name, an
objecting clerk should be accommodated in taking his or her name off of
marriage licenses, so long as it is done on all licenses and not just those for
same-sex couples.
The reason for allowing this accommodation, where doing so does not
directly and materially harm others, is to protect the religious freedom of
someone who cannot do something that violates a core tenet of their
religion. It is important to accommodate these sorts of concerns so long as
they can be accommodating without materially harming others; lest we
impose our values on people with different values and traditions.57 Of
course, the removal of the name must be applied equally to all marriage
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58
Cf. Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12,
2015) (noting that failure to issue the licenses or allow others to do so is unconstitutional).
59
RAVITCH, supra note 4, at chs. 2–3.
60
Cf. Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2574–79 (2015) (recognizing that direct
confrontation can increase dignitary harm, but still suggesting that dignitary harm more generally must
be addressed).
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licenses and could only be done if licenses issued without the name would
remain valid.
The fourth parameter is a matter of common sense. If the main duty of
an official is to issue marriage licenses or perform civil ceremonies, and the
official cannot do so based on religious objections, there could be no
accommodation. One option in this context, at least where the official is not
elected, would be to relocate the employee. This would be at the discretion
of the agency and would need to be done without negatively impacting
others. For example, as where someone else in the office wants to perform
the objecting employee’s job and the objecting employee can be transferred
without harming other employees. In the case of officials elected to do that
specific duty, however, performing the duty equally for all citizens or
stepping down are the only options allowed short of violating the
Constitution.58 As a practical matter this may rarely come up because
county clerks and civil magistrates often perform many functions, only one
of which is issuing marriage licenses or performing civil marriage
ceremonies. In these cases, parameters one and two would govern.
The fifth parameter is both important and problematic. It is important
due to the severity of the dignitary harm that can be fostered in situations
where a government official seeks out media attention for the denial of
service to citizens or where the official directly confronts the citizens in a
disrespectful manner. As I have explained elsewhere, the mere existence of
potential dignitary harm is not enough to deny exemptions.59 Yet, in some
situations the dignitary harm is severe and exacerbated by the behavior of
the government official(s) who seek religious exemptions.60 In these cases,
as opposed to situations where a government official is accommodated and
simply has someone else perform the duty or where the government official
tells the citizens that he or she cannot perform the duty but will immediately
get someone who can, the dignitary harm caused to the citizens would be
direct and material.
This parameter is problematic because we are dealing with issues that
could impact freedom of speech. Here, however, the fact that we are dealing
with government officials and employees helps answer the question. The
Supreme Court has long drawn a distinction between government officials
and employees speaking as private citizens on matters of public importance
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Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Id.
63
Miller v. Davis, Civ. Action No. 15-44-DLB, 2015 WL 4866729 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2015);
WKYT, Same Sex Couple Confronts Kentucky Clerk, N.Y. TIMES VIDEO (Sept. 1, 2015),
www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000003885415/same-sex-couple-confronts-kentucky-clerk.html (Davis
says clearly that she is denying the license based on “God’s authority.”).
62

C M
Y K

04/28/2016 10:11:02

61

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 91 Side A

and speaking in their capacity as government officials or employees.61
When speaking in their capacity as government officials or employees
speech can be limited. While government officials or employees speak as
private citizens on matters of public concern, however, their freedom of
speech is more carefully protected.62
Here, the very issue arises from performance of government duties so
any speech involved would be in the actors’ capacity as government
officials or employees. Therefore, if the government official or employee
contacts the media to announce that he or she will not serve same-sex
couples, or the official or employee confronts same-sex couples in a
disrespectful way, the employee or official is speaking in his or her capacity
as a government official or employee. Therefore, such speech can be
limited. In this case the limitation would result in the denial of an
accommodation because of the harm inflicted on citizens. Simply saying, “I
cannot help you with that; I will get someone who can,” is not the sort of
thing that would raise these concerns.
What about the Kim Davis situation? Kim Davis did not make the
initial contact with the media, so as an initial matter the problem was that
she violated parameters one and two. As things progressed, however, she
and her lawyers called additional attention to the situation. This creates a
sort of chicken or the egg problem. Had the media not already been paying
attention to her case perhaps this would violate parameter five, but since the
media was already focused on the case it is a tougher call. Her direct
contact with the couples she refused to serve, however, would violate
parameter five. She did more than say something like, “Sorry, I can’t serve
you, I will get someone who can.” She refused to allow anyone to serve
these couples, and she made sure the couples knew why in no uncertain
terms.63
This is significant because when Davis refused to issue marriage
licenses on the basis of her religious objection to same sex marriage she
made clear that it is because she thinks same-sex marriage is a sin, and she
said so in her capacity as a government official. The fact that she denied
licenses to all couples, whether same sex or not, does not change the
analysis, because her reasons for doing so were openly and directly based
on her objection to same sex-marriage. Moreover, she confronted same-sex
couples, and even though she did not act viciously or in an openly mean-
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spirited manner towards same-sex couples, she denied them the license
because she viewed their exercise of their constitutional rights as a sin and
openly said so. Therefore, she violated parameter five. The sort of dignitary
harm caused by such a direct refusal and denunciation by a government
official is different from a situation where a government official simply
asks someone else in the office to perform a duty.
It may be that in the latter situation the couple knows, or can easily
figure out, the reason. As a result, they may feel some sense of dignitary
harm, or they may simply respect the rights of the clerk and view the
situation as part of living in a pluralistic society. As I have written
elsewhere, such an indirect dignitary harm should not be a basis to deny a
religious accommodation.64 When the government official directly
confronts citizens in the manner Kim Davis did, the situation reaches a
different level and would violate parameter five. It may also violate the
Establishment Clause.
CONCLUSION
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Religious freedom and same-sex marriage need not conflict, even in
contested contexts like requests for accommodation by government
officials. Religious accommodations can and should be given where doing
so would not delay service or lower the level of service provided same-sex
couples. In some contexts, such as where there is only one official who can
perform a specific function, this may mean that the official cannot be
accommodated, because the accommodation would infringe on the
fundamental rights of same-sex couples.
The Kim Davis case is a bad example because she made herself almost
impossible to accommodate without violating the rights of citizens. Yet, for
every Kim Davis there are numerous government officials who would
welcome accommodations such as allowing others in the office to perform
the duties to which they object or having their name removed from forms so
long as the forms remain valid under state law. Both of these
accommodations rejected at one point or another by Davis. Recent laws in
North Carolina and Utah demonstrate it is possible to accommodate
religious freedom claims without delaying or lowering the level of service
provided to same-sex couples. These laws are not perfect, but they provide
excellent and workable proof of concept.

RAVITCH, supra note 4.
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